Code Generation for Data Processing Lecture 11: JIT Compilation and Sandboxing

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JIT Compilation

Ahead-of-Time compilation not always possible/sufficient

- "Dynamic source" code: pre-compilation not possible
 - JavaScript, eval(), database queries
 - Binary translation of highly-dynamic/JIT-compiled code
- Additional verification/analysis or increased portability desired
 - (e)BPF, WebAssembly
- Dynamic optimization on common types/values
 - Run-time sampling of frequent code paths, allows dynamic speculation
 - Relevant for highly dynamic languages otherwise prefer PGO⁵⁵

JIT Compilation: Simple Approach

Use standard compiler, write shared library
Can write compiler IR, or plain source code
dlopen + dlsym to find compiled function

Example: libgccjit

- + Simple, fairly easy to debug
- Very high overhead, needs IO

JIT: Allocating Memory

- malloc() memory often non-executable
- alloca() memory often non-executable
- ▶ mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) $W \oplus X$ may prevent this
 - $W \oplus X$: a page must never be writable and executable at the same time
 - Some OS's (e.g. OpenBSD) and CPUs (Apple Silicon) strictly enforce this
- ► For code generation: map pages read-write
 - NetBSD needs special argument to allow remapping the page as executable
- ▶ Before execution: change protection to (read–)execute

JIT: Making Code Executable

Adjust page-level protections: mprotect

- OS will adjust page tables
- Typically incurs TLB shootdown
- Other steps might be needed, highly OS-dependent
 - Read manual

JIT: Making Code Executable

Flush instruction cache

- Flush DCache to unification point (last-level cache)
- Invalidate ICache in all cores for virtual address range
 - After local flush, kernel might move thread to other core with old ICache
- x86: coherent ICache/DCache hierarchy hardware detects changes
 - ► Also includes: transparent (but expensive) detection of self-modifying code
- ► AArch64, MIPS, SPARC, ... (Linux): user-space instructions
- ▶ ARMv7, RISC-V⁵⁶ (Linux), all non-x86 (Darwin): system call

Skipping ICache flush: spurious, hard-to-debug problems

Code Generation: Differences AoT vs. JIT

	Ahead-of-Time	JIT Compilation
Code Model Relocations Symbols	Arbitrary Linker/Loader Linker/Loader	Large (or PIC with custom PLT) JIT compiler/linker JIT compiler/linker may need application symbols
Memory Mapping EHFrame	OS/Loader Compiler/Linker/Loader	JIT compiler/linker JIT compiler/linker
Debuginfo	Compiler/Linker/Debugger	register in unwind runtime JIT compiler register with debugger



JIT: Code Model

Code can be located anywhere in address space

Cannot rely on linker to put in, e.g., lowest 2 GiB

Large code model: allows for arbitrarily-sized addresses

Small-PIC: possible for relocations inside object

Needs new PLT/GOT for other symbols

Overhead trade-off: wide immediates vs. extra indirection (PLT)

Further restrictions may apply (ISA/OS)

JIT: Relocations and Symbols

JIT compiler must take care of relocations

- Can try to directly process relocations during machine code gen.
- Not always possible: cyclic dependencies
- Option: behave like normal compiler with separate runtime linker
- Code may need to access functions/global variables from application
 - Option: JIT compiler "hard-codes" relevant symbols
 - Option: application registers relevant symbols
 - Option: application linked with --export-dynamic and use dlsym

JIT: Memory Layout

Never place code and (writable) data on same page

- $W \oplus X$; and writes near code can trigger self-modifying code detection
- Avoid many small allocations with one page each
- But: editing existing code pages is problematic
- Choose suitable alignment for code
 - Page alignment is too large: poor cache utilization
 - ICache cache line size not too relevant, decode buffer size is typical value: 16 bytes
 - Some basic blocks (e.g., hot loop entries) can benefit from 16-byte alignment

JIT: .eh_frame Registration (required for C++)

- Unwinder finds .eh_frame using program headers
- > Problem: JIT-compiled code has no program headers
- Idea: JIT compiler registers new code with runtime
- libc provides __register_frame and __deregister_frame
 - Call with address of first Frame Description Entry (FDE)
 - Historically also called by init code

JIT: GDB Debuginfo Registration (optional)

- GDB finds debug info from section headers of DSOs
- Problem: JIT-compiled code has no DSO
- Idea: JIT compiler registers new code with debugger
- Define function __jit_debug_register_code and global var. __jit_debug_descriptor
 - Call function on update; GDB places breakpoint in function
 - Prevent function from being inlined
- Descriptor is linked list of in-memory object files
 - Needs relocations applied, also for debug info

▶ Users: LLVM, Wasmtime, HHVM, ...; consumers: GDB, LLDB

JIT: Linux perf Registration (optional)

- perf tracks binary through backing file of mmap
- Problem 1: JIT-compiled code has no backing file for its mmap region
- Problem 2: after tracing, JIT-compiled code is gone
- ► Goal 1: map instructions to functions
- ► Goal 2: keep JIT-compiled code for detailed analysis
- Approach 1: dump function limits to /tmp/perf-<PID>.map⁵⁷
 Text file: format: startaddr size name\n
- ► Approach 2: needs an extra slide

JIT: Linux perf JITDUMP format (optional)

- ▶ JIT-compiler dumps function name/address/size/code⁵⁸
 - ▶ JITDUMP file: record list for each function, may contain debuginfo
 - File name must be jit-<PID>.dump
- ▶ JIT-compiler mmaps part of the file as executable somewhere
 - Only use: perf keeps track of executable mappings ~> mapping is JIT marker, s.t. perf can find the file later
- ▶ Need to run perf report with -k 1 to use monotonic clock
- After profiling: perf inject --jit -i perf.data -o jit.data
 - Extracts functions from JITDUMP, each into its own ELF file
 - Changes mappings of profile to refer to newly created files

perf report -i jit.data - Profit!


Compilation Time

Problem: code generation takes time

- Especially high-complexity frameworks like GCC or LLVM
- Compilation time of JIT compilers often matters
 - Example: website needing JavaScript on page load
 - Example: compiling database query
- Functions executed once are not worth optimizing
- But: often not known in advance
- Idea: adaptive compilation
- Incrementally spend more time on optimization

Compilation Time: Simple Approach

Caching



Adaptive Execution

Execution tiers have different compile-time/run-time tradeoffs

- Bytecode interpreter: very fast/slow
- Fast compiler: medium/medium
- Optimizing compiler: slow/fast
- Start with interpreter, profile execution
 - E.g., collect stats on execution frequency, dynamic types, ...
- For program worth optimizing, switch to next tier
 - > Depends on profile information, e.g. only optimize hot code
 - Compile in background, switch when ready

Adaptive Execution: Switching Tiers

- Switching only possible at compiler-defined points
 - Needs to serialize relevant state for other tier
- Simple approach: only switch at function boundaries
 - Simple, well-defined boundaries; unable to switch inside loop
- Complex approach: allow switching at loop headers/everywhere
 - Needs tracking of much more meta-information
 - All entry points need well-defined interface
 - All exit points need info to recover complete state
 - Severely limits optimizations; all loops become irreducible
- Using LLVM is possible, but not a good fit

Adaptive Execution: Partial Compilation and Speculation

- Observation: even in hot functions, many branches are rarely used
- Optimizing cold code is wasted time(/energy)
- Observation (JS): functions often get called with same data type
 Specializing on structure allows removing string lookup for fields
- Idea: speculate on common path using profiling data
- Add check whether speculation holds; if not, use side-exit
 - Side-exit can be patched later with actual code
- Side-exit must serialize all relevant state for lower tier
 - "Deoptimization"

Sandboxing

Executing untrusted code without additional measures may harm system

- Untrusted input may expose vulnerabilities
- ► Goal 1: execute untrusted code without impacting security
 - Code in higher-level representation allows for further analyses but needs JIT compilation for performance
- ► Goal 2: limit impact potential of new vulnerabilities
- Other goals: portability, resource usage, performance, usability, language flexibility

Approach: Sandbox Operating System as-is

- Idea: put entire operating system in sandbox ("virtual machine")
- Widely used in practice
- Virtualization needs hardware and OS support
 - CPU has hypervisor mode which controls guest OS; offers nested paging, hypercalls from guest OS to hypervisor
- $+ \,$ Good usability and performance
- + Strong isolation
- Rather high overhead on resource usage: completely new OS
- Inflexible and high start latency (seconds)

Approach: Sandbox Native Code as-is

Idea: strongly restrict possibilities of native code

- Restrict system calls: seccomp
 - Filter program for system calls depending on arguments
- Separate namespaces: network, PID, user, mount, ...
 - Isolate program from rest of the system
 - Need to allow access to permitted resources
- Limit resource usage: memory, CPU, ... cgroups

Approach: Sandbox Native Code as-is

Frequently and widely used ("container")

- + Good usability and performance, low latency (milliseconds)
- + Finer grained control of resources
- $\sim\,$ Resource usage: often completely new user space
- Weak isolation: OS+CPU often bad at separation
 - Kernel has a fairly large interface, not hardened against bad actors
 - Privilege escalation happens not rarely

Approach: Sandbox Native Code with Modification

Idea: enforce limitations on machine code

- Define restrictions on machine code, e.g. no unbounded memory access
- Modify compiler to comply with restrictions
- Verify program at load time
- ► Google Native Client⁵⁹, originally x86-32, ported to x86-64 and ARM
- Designed as browser extension
- Native code shipped to browser, executed after validation

NaCl Constraints on i386

- Problem: dynamic code not verifiable
 - \Rightarrow No self-modifying/dynamically generated code
- Problem: overlapping instructions
 - \Rightarrow All "valid" instructions must be reachable in linear disassembly
 - \Rightarrow Direct jumps must target valid instructions
 - \Rightarrow No instruction may cross 32-byte boundary
 - \Rightarrow Indirect jumps/returns must be and eax, -32; jmp eax
- Problem: arbitrary memory access inside virtual memory
 - \Rightarrow Separate process, use segmentation restrict accessible memory
- Problem: program can run arbitrary CPU instructions
 - \Rightarrow Blacklist "dangerous" instructions

NaCl on non-i386 Systems

▶ Other architectures⁶⁰ use base register instead of segment offsets

- Additional verification required
- Deprecated in 2017 in favor of WebAssembly
- + Nice idea, high performance (5–15% overhead)
- $\sim~$ Instruction blacklist not a good idea
- Not portable, severe restrictions on emitted code
- High verification complexity, error-prone

Approach: Using Bytecode

Idea: compile code to bytecode, JIT-compile on host

- Benefit: verification easy all code generated by trusted compiler
- Benefit: more portable
- Java applets
- PNaCl: bytecode version of NaCl
- + Fairly high performance, portable
- $\sim~$ Heavy runtime environment
 - Especially criticized for Java applets
- Very high complexity and attack surface

Approach: Subset of JavaScript: asm.js

Situation: fairly fast JavaScript JIT-compilers present

- Idea: use subset of JavaScript known to be compilable to efficient code
 - All browsers/JS engines support execution without further changes
- asm.js⁶¹: strictly, statically typed JS subset; single array as heap
- ► JS code generated by compilers, e.g. Emscripten
- JavaScript has single numeric type, but asm.js supports int/float/double
 - Coercion to integer: x|0
 - Coercion to double: +x
 - Coercion to float: Math.fround(x)

asm.js Example

```
var log = stdlib.Math.log;
var values = new stdlib.Float64Array(buffer);
function logSum(start, end) {
  start = start|0; // parameter type int
  end = end|0; // parameter type int
```

```
var sum = 0.0, p = 0, q = 0;
```

```
// asm.js forces byte addressing of the heap by requiring shifting by 3
for (p = start << 3, q = end << 3; (p|0) < (q|0); p = (p + 8)|0) {
    sum = sum + +log(values[p>>3]);
}
```

return +sum;

}

Example taken from the specification

Approach: Encode asm.js as Bytecode

Parsing costs time, type restrictions increase code size
 Idea: encode asm.js source as bytecode

First attempt: encode abstract syntax tree in pre-order
 Second attempt: encode abstract syntax tree in post-order

- Third attempt: encode as stack machine
- ▶ ... and WebAssembly was born

Approach: Using Bytecode – WebAssembly

- Strictly-typed bytecode format encoding a stack machine
- Global variables and single, global array as memory
- Functions have local variables
 - Parameters pre-populated in first local variables
 - ▶ No dynamic/addressable stack space! ~→ part of global memory used as stack
- Operations use implicit stack
 - Stack has well-defined size and types at each point in program
- Structured control flow
 - Blocks to skip instructions, loop to repeat, if-then-else
 - ► No irreducible control flow representable

Approach: Use Verifiable Bytecode – eBPF

Problem: want to ensure termination within certain time frame

- Problem: need to make sure nothing can go wrong no sandbox!
- ► Idea: disallow loops and undefined register values, e.g. due to branch
 - Combinatorial explosion of possible paths, all need to be analyzed
 - No longer Turing-complete
- ▶ eBPF: allow user-space to hook into various Linux kernel parts
 - E.g. network, perf sampling, ...
- Strongly verified register machine
- JIT-compiled inside kernel

JIT Compilation and Sandboxing – Summary

- ► JIT compilation required for dynamic source code or bytecode
- Bytecode allows for simpler verification than machine code, but is more compact
- ▶ Producing JIT-compiled code needs CPU, OS, and runtime support
- JIT compilers can do/need to do different kinds of optimizations adaptive execution is key technique to hide compilation latency
- Sandboxing can be done at various levels and granularities
- Virtualization and containers widely used for whole applications
- Bytecode formats popular for ad-hoc distribution of programs

JIT Compilation and Sandboxing – Questions

- When is JIT-compilation beneficial over Ahead-of-Time compilation?
- How can JIT-compilation be realized using standard compilers?
- How can code be made executable after writing it to memory?
- ▶ Why do some architectures require a system call for ICache flushing?
- ► How can JIT compilers trade between compilation latency and performance?
- Why is sandboxing important?
- What methods of deploying code for sandboxed execution are widely used?